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ABSTRACT
In the global justice debate, our duties to compatriots and foreigners are 
often held to differ in terms of demandingness. Statists, in particular, think 
that duties to compatriots are more demanding than duties to foreigners. 
In this article, we flesh out and scrutinize the main elements of Liam 
Shields’ considerations about global justice in his recent book, Just Enough. 
Shields notes that the global justice debate largely overlooks that our duties 
may be more or less demanding in two distinct respects; in terms of content 
and in terms of stringency. He suggests that the distinction between 
content and stringency, combined with his sufficientarian thesis, opens up 
new and (more) plausible positions in the debate. Here, we flesh out the 
implications of Shields’ tentative suggestions and consider the viability 
and novelty of the potential positions it permits. We conclude that his 
considerations of content provide little new to the debate, as this is already 
the focus of most global justice theorists. However, stringency brings a 
much needed concern with how to prioritize conflicting duties to the 
debate, and potentially opens up a range of new positions on how to make 
sense of our duties across and within borders as well as allowing us to 
reimagine already existing theories. The article outlines some new 
potential positions and novel readings of existing views.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many of us feel a strong sense of moral outrage and obligation when 
confronted with news of malnourished children or people fleeing civil war 
abroad. Many have similar responses when confronted by the realities of 
inequality that affect their own societies, such as vastly unequal access to 
higher education, inequalities in wealth and property, and the larger 
obstacles to political influence faced by racial and cultural minorities. But 
which of these issues place greater moral demands on us and how do we 
even compare our obligations in the global and domestic realms?
For the last couple of decades, the debate about global distributive 
justice has been defined by a stark divide between two overarching sides: 
statists and cosmopolitans. Statists hold that our duties1 to compatriots are 
significantly more demanding than our duties to foreigners. Cosmopolitans, 
on the other hand, hold that compatriots and foreigners are entitled to 
(more or less) the same. The two sides often seem irreconcilable. In his 
book on distributive justice, Just Enough (2016), Liam Shields explores how 
his sufficientarian account of justice might be applied to the global realm 
in order to overcome this stalemate. He does so by introducing two 
variables that make possible new ways of conceptualizing our duties of 
global justice. 
These two new nuancing variables are:
1. The sufficiency threshold:  what we owe to others varies according 
to whether they fall below or above the sufficiency threshold; 
whether they already have enough. The debate between cosmo-
politans and statists has been about whether the domestic and 
global spheres are different realms to which different reasons apply. 
Shields’ sufficientarianism introduces an additional division of 
realms: it divides the realms of reason below or above the sufficiency 
threshold.
2. Two components of demandingness: content and stringency. 
Content is about how much we owe others; stringency is about the 
urgency of fulfilling the duty when its fulfillment conflicts with 
other duties. The debate thus far has almost exclusively been about 
content-demandingness. Shields seeks to apply his sufficientarian 
reasoning to both content and stringency in the global realm.
Shields’ analysis is preliminary, but suggests new ways of nuancing the 
debate. In this paper, we build and elaborate on his aperçu, investigating 
how the resulting conceptual map compares to the existing positions on 
1 In this paper we use the terms duties and obligations interchangeably
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global distributive justice, and exploring whether it, in fact, opens up 
hybrid positions between the two ends of the statist-cosmopolitan divide. 
We conclude that the combination of a sufficiency threshold and a shift in 
content-demandingness does not produce new viable positions. However, 
the distinction between content and stringency can provide new 
perspectives on the debate. Thus, we flesh out how the stringency 
dimension can inform contemporary debates of global distributive justice. 
We begin by briefly explaining Shields’ view on sufficiency and the 
distinction between content and stringency within demandingness of 
duties upon which his analysis turns. 
2. SUFFICIENCY AND DEMANDINGNESS IN GLOBAL 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
The central claim of Shields’ book is that justice makes different demands 
upon us depending on whether the individuals with whom we are 
concerned are above or below the sufficiency threshold. This is because 
our reasons for what individuals are entitled to and what duties we have 
with respect to meeting those entitlements differ, or shift, once we move 
from a context in which some have less than enough to a context in which 
everyone has enough. Furthermore, it is the case, Shields stipulates, that 
for several central dimensions of societal justice, the primary goal is to 
ensure sufficiency for everyone, and once someone reaches this threshold, 
benefitting them further brings about a different kind of value or is 
supported by a different sort of reason. Reasons that, in this way, apply 
only up to a certain threshold are referred to as satiable.
For example, our reasons to give a loaf of bread to someone who is 
starving are different from the reasons we may have to give a loaf to 
someone who is well fed but collects loaves of bread as a welfare-generating 
hobby (however passionately). And this might be explained by the fact that 
when one is below a threshold of basic needs (starvation) our reasons to 
benefit her are of a different character than the reasons we have to benefit 
someone above the basic needs threshold (loaf-collector). Reasons to do 
with basic needs are satiable. This is what Shields calls the shift thesis.2 
This idea underlies the first nuancing variable.
In the book’s chapter on Sufficiency and Global Justice, Shields, points 
2 As Robert Huseby points out in his article in this volume, there are two ways of 
understanding the shift; one which concerns the weight of additional benefits above the 
threshold and one which concerns a shift in the nature of the reasons. We think this second 
reading is the more plausible one and will, hence, be assuming that here.
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out that there are two ways to characterize the demandingness of a duty; 
two ways in which one duty can be more demanding than another. First, 
the demandingness of a duty may refer to the content of the duty. This 
refers to “the conditions under which the obligation has been successfully 
discharged” (Shields, 2016: 173). In other words, the demandingness of our 
duties refers to how much it takes for them to be fulfilled. A duty is more 
demanding than another content-wise when it requires more of us than 
the other duty does. For example, if a good friend invites you to a wedding 
then you are, barring exceptional circumstances, obligated to go. If, on the 
other hand, a stranger (generously and somewhat surprisingly) invites you 
their wedding you are not obligated to go. However, you do owe them 
declining their offer politely. Duties to friends, we normally think, demand 
more of us in terms of time and effort. In what follows we refer to the 
content dimension of demandingness as content-demandingness. 
Second, the demandingness of a duty may refer to its stringency, by 
which Shields means the priority that is attached to the duty’s fulfillment 
(Shields, 2016: 177). A more stringent duty, then, is more urgent to fulfill. A 
duty, D1, is more stringent than a duty, D2, when fulfilling D1 takes priority 
over fulfilling D2. This means that we should fulfill D1 before fulfilling D2 
and that if the two duties clash such that we could only fulfill one, we 
should fulfill D1. In terms of demandingness, whereas content concerns 
the ‘size’ of the duties, stringency denotes the ‘weight’ to assign to the 
fulfillment of a particular obligation. To illustrate the notion of stringency, 
imagine you are sitting between a friend and a stranger who are both 
suffering from heartache (incurred, perhaps, because the weddings to 
which they both invited you are not going as planned). Imagine further 
that you are in the position to alleviate their pain somewhat by way of a 
similar effort; a kind word. In terms of content-demandingness, in other 
words, the two are the same. You might, further, think you have moral 
reasons to do both. But the urgency of fulfilling those duties would differ; 
the stringency of your obligation to your friend would be greater. In what 
follows we refer to the stringency dimension of demandingness simply as 
stringency.
3. A GLOBAL SHIFT IN CONTENT?
As mentioned in the introduction, statists and cosmopolitans disagree 
about the comparative demandingness of domestic and global duties of 
justice. The notion of demandingness that influential statist and 
cosmopolitan accounts employ is (usually) content-demandingness.3 The 
3 See, however, Miller (1995: Ch. 3; 2013: Ch. 7)
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main focus for statists against cosmopolitans, thus, is that our duties to 
co-citizens demand significantly more of us than our duties to foreigners 
in terms of content. In this section, we investigate whether introducing 
Shields’s sufficientarian shift thesis to the current debate about content-
demandingness brings out new distinctive positions. 
Many statists have a sufficientarian component in their theories of 
global justice and hold that, while we have egalitarian duties to our 
compatriots, for instance, we are only obligated to ensure that foreigners 
reach a level of sufficiency (Blake, 2001; Miller, 2007; Sangiovanni, 2007). 
Clearly, on statist accounts, duties to compatriots are more content-
demanding than duties to foreigners. For statists, the difference between 
what we owe compatriots and what we owe foreigners stems from the fact 
that the domestic sphere and the global sphere are two distinct areas of 
interaction each with different reasons of justice operating within it.  
Some cosmopolitans also have a sufficientarian component in their 
views. Either by defending a high threshold of sufficiency for everyone 
(Nielsen & Axelsen, 2016; Nussbaum, 2000) or by arguing for a (lower) 
global sufficiency threshold as part of what is owed to everyone (Caney, 
2005: 122; Shue, 1980). For cosmopolitans, unlike for statists, the same 
reasons of justice are at play within the domestic and global spheres 
(although, obligations may differ depending on how well-placed one is to 
fulfill them – Caney, 2011: 514; Goodin, 1988). The duties to compatriots 
and foreigners are equally demanding in terms of content. 
Shields suggests that statists and cosmopolitans each capture one 
familiar and plausible intuition which he calls, respectively, ‘Compatriot 
Partiality’ and ‘State is Arbitrary’ (2016: 188). The aim of his sufficientarian 
global justice exploration, then, is to seek to capture both. One can do this, 
Shields holds, by applying the shift thesis to our theorizing: how we reason 
about distributive justice is different for a context where some fall below 
the sufficiency threshold compared to a context where all are above the 
threshold. This opens up positions according to which our obligations to 
compatriots vary depending on whether they are below or above the 
threshold, making space for some (threshold-dependent) partiality towards 
compatriots. But it still leaves room to say that this partiality should be 
contingent on whether (or the degree to which) foreigners are below or 
above sufficiency, thus including a concern with the morally arbitrary 
effect one’s birth country has on one’s life prospects into in the reasoning. 
This, Shields suggests, opens up new positions in the debate. Most 
interesting, he thinks, are those potential positions where compatriots or 
foreigners crossing the threshold of sufficiency leads one to shift from 
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being a statist to being a cosmopolitan, or vice versa.4 Shields outlines one 
version of a shift from statism to cosmopolitanism: “we could owe 
prioritarianism domestically and sufficiency globally but once some level 
of sufficiency is reached for one or both groups, we owe equality to all” 
(Shields 2016: 176).5
However, it is unclear to us that a shift in content does, or even could, 
actually open up any viable or new positions on global justice. Consider 
the example Shields uses where one shifts from being a statist to being a 
cosmopolitan once we cross the sufficiency threshold. Now, according to 
Shields, reasons that can justify the existence of a threshold are ones that 
are satiable. The main candidates for satiable reasons that Shields explores 
in previous chapters are basic needs and autonomy. Both are satiable in 
the sense that they do not provide a normative basis for benefits above a 
certain level (the threshold) (Shields 2016: 34-37). But it is not clear how 
such satiable reasons can justify a division between the global and 
domestic realms in terms of content. Reasons of basic needs and autonomy 
apply universally; everyone shares the trait that gives rise to the relevant 
obligations. And, indeed, when theorists in the global justice debate, be it 
statists or cosmopolitans, claim that we owe basic needs fulfillment to 
foreigners, they do so on the basis of universal human traits and 
vulnerabilities, not because the potential recipients are foreigners.6 Shields, 
it seems, assumes that a division between the two realms can be drawn. 
But that is difficult to justify on his account, since no satiable reasons seem 
to support this divide. It is difficult to see, then, how one can be a statist 
about content below the threshold.
Now, despite this, one might still consider the global and domestic 
realms to be distinct when reasoning about the demands justice. One 
might do so even when the content of our duties in both realms is basic 
needs fulfillment and where our duties in the domestic realm are more 
demanding than globally for other reasons, and perhaps this is what 
Shields has in mind. But differences between the two realms are, then, due 
to the different reasons we have to prioritize duties to compatriots vs. 
4 Shields refers to this as radical content shift sufficientarianism (2016: 176).
5 Shields’ example identifies distributive rules; priority, sufficiency, and equality. 
Distributive rules, although they are often built around reasons that provide content, are 
not in themselves content. This is an issue because several distributive rules have stringency 
considerations as a constitutive feature. Prioritarianism, in particular, says less about how 
much we owe to someone than about how urgent it is to fulfill such duties. Although, this 
makes it more difficult to evaluate Shields’ content-position, we disregard this issue here.
6 This issue applies when the threshold is the same for the domestic and the global 
realm. One might think that two different thresholds govern the two realms. It is possible 
that Shields has this in mind. If he does, he does not mention it and, in any case, this would 
give rise to a host of very different and difficult questions.
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foreigners. In other words, such considerations concern reasons to give the 
fulfillment of one group’s basic needs higher priority. But this difference is 
not one of content-demandingness, but of stringency; it tells us something 
about how urgent it is to get people in different realms up to the threshold. 
We conclude that it is not clear that applying the shift thesis to the content-
dimension of demandingness adds viable and consistent new positions to 
the global justice debate. We now move to discuss the stringency dimension 
and explore whether it provides us with new positions or insights into the 
global justice question. We think it does. 
4. STRINGENCY IN GLOBAL JUSTICE
The global justice debate has to a large extent focused on what we owe to 
compatriots and non-compatriots as a matter of justice: whether and to 
what extent duties to compatriots make greater demands on us than duties 
to foreigners. However, as Shields points out, the debate about our duties of 
global justice has paid little attention to a different dimension of 
demandingness: stringency. To recall, we say that a duty, D1, is more 
stringent than a duty, D2, when fulfilling D1 takes priority over fulfilling 
D2. Shields says little about what influences stringency considerations and 
how stringency might illuminate the debate on global justice. However, we 
think the idea of treating stringency as a separate dimension has a number 
of advantages and generates valuable insights. In this section, we flesh out 
and explore how it may do so. 
Introducing the stringency dimension opens up new possible theoretical 
positions in the global justice debate whose plausibility can be explored 
further. Stringency works as a new dividing line that brings some positions 
closer together and pushes others farther apart than otherwise assumed. A 
new and different conceptual map emerges when we take the comparative 
stringency of duties into consideration because one’s view regarding the 
comparative stringency of our domestic and global duties of justice 
need not necessarily track one’s view on the comparative content-
demandingness of those duties. The two dimensions, in other words, 
come apart. For instance, one might hold, like statists do, that the content 
of justice-based duties to others depends on whether or not one shares 
membership in a state; i.e. equality for co-citizens and basic needs 
fulfillment for foreigners. But one might also think that state membership 
plays no role in defining the stringency of our obligations. Instead, factors 
such as how badly off a person is, how urgent their plight is, etc., would 
then determine this. We can say of such a position that it is statist about 
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content but cosmopolitan about stringency. To illustrate this difference 
and how Shields’ distinction may look in practice, consider Andrea 
Sangiovanni’s account of global justice.7
Sangiovanni thinks that we owe more (in terms of content) to co-
nationals than we do to foreigners. This is because, on his reciprocity-
based conception of justice, we owe others a fair return on their 
participation in the cooperative scheme we share with them. As such, we 
owe co-nationals a fair return on their participation in the cooperative 
scheme that is the state, and we owe foreigners a fair return on their 
participation in the cooperative schemes that function globally.8  According 
to Sangiovanni both the type of goods produced and the extent of one’s 
contribution to their production are significantly more encompassing 
domestically than they are globally, and this explains why we owe co-
nationals more. But nothing in Sangiovanni’s account commits him to 
assigning higher stringency to domestic duties of justice over global duties. 
Although Sangiovanni does not explicitly take a stand on this, his view at 
least allows for the possibility that the stringency of duties is not 
membership dependent. A view about content like Sangiovanni’s is 
therefore compatible with a view assigning higher stringency to fulfilling 
duties to those who are very badly off or to those for whom it is more urgent 
that duties are fulfilled, independently of whether they are compatriots or 
foreigners. In policy terms, such a view would entail that we should seek to 
alleviate global poverty before turning to domestic inequalities. 
Indeed, the grounds upon which Sangiovanni’s account is built are 
particularly well-suited for this interpretation, since there is nothing 
inherent in his conception of reciprocity or the content of the particular 
duties that justifies granting one precedence over the other. It would be 
perfectly compatible with such an account to say that duties to the badly-
off ought to take precedence regardless of whether those suffering this 
plight are co-nationals or foreigners. Thus, for an account like the one 
proposed by Sangiovanni, a whole range of positions on stringency is 
available. And this includes the one sketched here which, as far as we know, 
is an unoccupied seat in the global justice debate chamber.
The space opened up by introducing the stringency dimension becomes 
clearer if Sangiovanni’s position is contrasted with one that does not allow 
7 We also note that Thomas Nagel (2005) makes a number of comments that suggest 
sympathy to the view that factors related to urgency of need influence the stringency of 
duties. He writes, for instance, that “[t]he urgent current issue is what can be done in the 
world economy to reduce extreme global poverty” (118, emphasis added). We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
8 See Sangiovanni (2007), p. 4, fn. 5 for his view about what is owed to all human 
beings.
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for similar interpretations. The way in which David Miller’s statist account 
is grounded, for example, seems to commit him to assigning higher 
stringency to our duties to co-nationals, to be, in other words, statist about 
content and about stringency. Miller thinks that our duties to co-nationals 
are more demanding in terms of content than our duties to foreigners. To 
Miller, this is because co-nationals share a relationship that is intrinsically 
valuable. Furthermore, having and acting on special commitments to each 
other are constitutive elements of what makes the relationship between 
co-nationals valuable in this manner. In order to maintain the intrinsic 
value that flows from such relations, then, co-nationals must give (some, 
although not absolute) priority to fulfilling their duties of social justice 
over those of global justice (Miller 2007: 40; 2013: 175-179). Such relations, 
on the other hand, do not exist globally and so similar priority is not 
required. Unlike for Sangiovanni, then, on Miller’s version of statism, 
higher stringency to domestic duties is constitutive of the account. 
In our world of massive global inequalities, statist views strike many as 
morally objectionable for asserting that duties of domestic justice eclipse 
duties of global justice. But as we have pointed out, when statists talk of 
demandingness, most often they are talking about content-demandingness. 
Taking note of the fact that one’s view on stringency can come apart from 
one’s view on content-demandingness renders some statist views less 
objectionable from this point of view. A statist position as Sangiovanni’s, 
for instance, seems more plausible if combined with a cosmopolitan take 
on stringency; a view, that is, which assigns higher stringency to fulfilling 
our duties to the worse off or those most urgently in need of help regardless 
of their membership. And, in that, it is importantly different from a view 
such as Miller’s which, if we are right, is committed to assigning both 
higher content-demandingness and higher stringency to our domestic 
duties of justice. 
The stringency dimension of our duties of justice has potential 
implications for cosmopolitan positions too. For just as it is open for statists 
to be cosmopolitan about stringency, it is open for cosmopolitans to be 
statist about stringency. Cosmopolitans can, for instance, maintain that 
domestic and global duties of justice are equally demanding but submit 
that fulfilling our duties to compatriots takes priority. Or they can be 
cosmopolitan through and through, maintaining that both the content 
and stringency demandingness of our duties to compatriots are on par 
with our duties to foreigners. Reasons for why a person can have a more 
stringent duty to fulfill D1 (e.g. domestic duties) than to fulfill D2 (e.g. 
global duties) include that she is in a better position to fulfill D1, or that she 
has created the expectation in targets of D1 that she will fulfill D1, or even 
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plain partiality towards the targets of D1 on account of their special 
relationship.  Several factors, thus, might impact our judgement of the 
comparative stringency of our duties, some have to do with the level of 
wellbeing of the target of the duty, others have to do with the capacity of 
the duty holder, and others still with the relationship between the duty 
holder and the target.
Some cosmopolitans have noted this possibility. Simon Caney, for 
example, is of the view that both compatriots and foreigners are equally 
entitled to equality of opportunity but entertains the possibility that: “[o]
ne has a ‘special’ duty to protect the (cosmopolitan) entitlements of one’s 
fellow citizens, as well as a ‘general’ duty to protect the cosmopolitan 
entitlements of everyone” (2008: 511). Caney is vague on what could justify 
uncoupling entitlements from duties. And it seems to us that the best way 
to make sense of Caney’s view would be to understand him as highlighting 
exactly the distinction between the content of duties of justice and their 
stringency: the content of what we owe to compatriots and foreigners is the 
same; but in terms of stringency, what we owe to compatriots might be 
more demanding. This is an interesting potential position on global justice, 
one that may in some of its variants be attractive to those who worry that 
standard cosmopolitan views do not leave adequate space for ethical 
partiality towards those with whom one shares special bonds such as one’s 
family or, in the case at hand (which is not as similar to that of families as 
some theorists would have us believe), one’s compatriots.
Besides separating the two dimensions of demandingness, Shields 
mentions the possibility of applying the shift thesis to stringency. Shields 
suggests that our reasons about the comparative sufficiency of duties shifts 
according to whether some are below the sufficiency threshold or all are 
above. It seems plausible to us to hold a view according to which stringency 
is determined by level of wellbeing when some are below the threshold but 
then shifts to being determined by other considerations such as legitimate 
expectations and ethical partiality when all are above the threshold.9 We 
merely want to note that if Shields is correct then this quickly multiplies 
the possible positions in the debate. Here is one possibility: one might be 
statist about content and cosmopolitan about stringency when some are 
below the sufficiency threshold (like in our reconstruction of Sangiovanni’s 
view), then back to being statist about stringency when all are above the 
threshold.  Another possibility would be that one is cosmopolitan about 
content and stringency when some are below the sufficiency threshold and 
9 It may seem as though there are no duties left to fulfil after everyone is above the 
sufficiency threshold if one is a statist. However, recall that Shields’ account is shift-
sufficientarian and, thus, places some (diminishing) value on adding benefits above the 
threshold.
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statist about stringency when all are above the threshold.10
Here, we have sketched a range of new positions that become possible 
with the introduction of stringency as a dimension of the demandingness 
of our duties of justice. It goes beyond the scope of this piece to evaluate 
the sketched positions. What we have done, instead, is to show how 
reconceptualizing and fleshing out Shields’ notion of stringency casts the 
global justice debate in a new light. 
5. CONCLUSION
Shields introduces two new ideas to the global justice debate. First, he 
applies the notion of a sufficiency threshold and suggests that this could 
apply to both the global and domestic realms; that we might have different 
obligations to both compatriots and foreigners, depending on whether 
they have enough. Second, he differentiates between two ways in which 
our obligations may vary in demandingness: content and stringency. In 
this paper, we have cast doubt on the usefulness of applying the content-
dimension of Shields’s sufficiency thesis to the global justice debate in 
which the global and domestic realms are separate. When spelled out 
clearly it turns out that it opens no new, viable positions regarding the 
content of our duties of global justice. The stringency dimension, however, 
does illuminate the global justice debate in new and interesting ways. 
While global justice theorists have sometimes hinted at considerations 
of stringency, it is indeed surprising that so relatively little attention has 
been paid to this aspect of our justice-based duties. Picking up on Shields’s 
suggestion that the content and stringency dimensions of our duties of 
justice are distinct and influenced by different considerations, we have 
tried to show how introducing the dimension of stringency can provide an 
alternative map of the global justice literature. 
But this is not just about conceptual possibilities. Understanding 
demandingness not only in terms of content but also in terms of stringency, 
allows us to see that some positions have more similar implications and 
others more dissimilar implications than otherwise thought. Consider two 
discussed statist accounts, Sangiovanni’s and Miller’s. While both agree 
10 Things become more interesting, and perhaps more plausible if we think that 
different goods may have different levels of stringency. For instance, we may think that we 
have especially stringent duties to ensure some goods for our compatriots – i.e. social status 
and political influence – which we are particularly well-placed to facilitate qua compatriots. 
But the duty to ensure other goods – i.e. those pertaining to material opportunities and 
freedom – might not entail differences in stringency across the two realms (because we are 
equally well-placed to provide these for foreigners).
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that our duties to compatriots are more demanding than duties to 
foreigners (albeit for different reasons) Sangiovanni’s account opens up 
the possibility of giving priority to the fulfillment of the basic needs of poor 
foreigners over social justice obligations to compatriots (even if the latter 
are more demanding in content). Miller’s account, on the other hand, does 
not seem to allow assigning the same stringency to basic need fulfillment. 
In this way, Sangiovanni might be closer to a cosmopolitan who assigns 
higher stringency to basic needs fulfillment, while Miller might be closer 
to a cosmopolitan who assigns higher stringency to fulfillment of domestic 
duties of justice. This reshuffling of positions can be useful in pulling the 
debate about global justice out of the stalemate in which it has, arguably, 
landed. And, no less importantly, thinking about stringency points us 
towards important discussions about what to do first, rather than merely 
speculating about where we should end up.
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